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I. Introduction
The World Wide Web offers the quickest way to reproduce and spread
information, thereby providing new challenges to existing copyright law.1
Innovations to technological communication on the Internet make
2disseminating information easy and inexpensive. On today's Internet,
virtually all levels of computer users can receive or distribute images, text,
sound, software, or data with one single click of the mouse. 3 In essence,
today's Web allows anyone to "influence the duplication and dissemination
of information around the world.'A User-generated content and
applications, where users can combine web applications and synchronize
one website's information with another's, comprise much of Web 2.0's
Internet.5 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act's ("DMCA") "safe
harbors" protect some website operators and online service providers
("OSPs") from both primary and secondary liability for copyright
infringement.6  Websites or online service providers that meet a safe
harbor's requirements escape copyright infringement liability, even though
their websites contain infringing material.7 In particular, they can avoid
third party liability for the infringing actions of their users. For example,
when a user or subscriber infringes on another's copyright and the website
or online service provider enables the viewing, listening, or display of the
1. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1890(2000).
2. Id. at 1834.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mary Madden and Susannah Fox, Riding the Waves of "Web 2.0", More Than a
Buzzword, But Still Not Easily Defined, BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 5, 2006, at 2,
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPWeb_2.0.pdf.
6. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
7. Id.
8. See id. § 512(c).
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infringing material, the website or online service provider can avoid
liability by instituting "good citizenship policies." 9
This note investigates whether generative web applications can "piggy
back" on the initial websites' safe harbor protections or whether such
applications are liable for primary infringement themselves. Such web
applications, like the Web 2.0 mashup ("mashup"), face potential liability
because they display user-generated, infringing material, which users
originally uploaded onto one of the previously existing websites used to
create the mashup. Part II describes the technology behind Web 2.0;
discusses how Web 2.0 differs from the previous world of Web 1.0; and
explains common Web 2.0 applications. Part III sets forth the legal
background of copyright liability, both for primary and secondary
infringement. Part IV examines whether web mashups are liable as direct
infringers, contributory infringers, vicarious infringers, or as new Grokster
inducement infringers. Finally, part V illustrates: (1) the competing values
in copyright law; (2) how the original underlying purposes of secondary
liability lack a connection to today's Internet; and (3) possible solutions to
what liability a mashup may face.
II. Web 2.0 and Web Mashups
A. The Internet and Web Pages
The World Wide Web, or the Internet, ("the Web") is a worldwide
collection of computer networks all linked by communications lines.10
Because computer networks cooperate with each other and are
interconnected, users can "access other computers with their local
computer," exchanging data and information in a variety of forms. I'
Website companies distribute information on the Internet via "Web pages"
in the form of text documents, graphic files (including digital photos and
art), and even digitized sound and audio files. 12 The Internet allows users
both to place information on the Web as well as to receive information
from the Web. 13 The Internet's limits extend as far as the creativity and
imagination of users and programmers will allow.
9. Id. (Specific "good citizenship policies" include: (1) providing a notice and take-down
procedure, whereby copyright owners notify the OSP of the infringing material and the OSP will
take it down, and (2) terminating subscribers that repeatedly infringe.).






B. What is Web 2.0?
Today's World Wide Web ("Web 2.0") is a new and improved version
from the Web of the past ("Web 1.0"). Web 2.0 is the term commonly
used to refer to "technology that encourages sharing, user input and
community."' 4  Specifically, it is a second generation of Web-based
services, including blogs, social networking sites, RSS feeds, podcasts,
Web APIs,' 5 and mashups.16 Such applications involve the end-user, more
than the previous Web 1.0 applications era. 17 End-users1 8 not only use the
services available on the Internet but also interact with them, and even
create new applications.' 9 Web 2.0 makes user-generated content and
interaction possible because, rather than using the PC as its platform as
Web 1.0 does, Web 2.0 uses the Internet as its platform.20  Typical user
interaction in the world of Web 2.0 includes tagging content or contributing
user content through podcasts, social networking, or blogging.2 1 Many
Web 2.0 activities may not seem innovative to the everyday Internet user,
but fall into the Web 2.0 category because they enable and allow users to
create content and to interact with other users.22  As the American
14. Verne Kopytoff, THE INTERNET Web 2.0 Tech Leaders, Wannabes Gather in San
Francisco Supernova2006 Good for Networking with Internet Crowd, June 23, 2006,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archve/2006/06/23/BUG2B
JIKPLI.DTL&type=business.
15. An API is an application programming interface. APIs are "[tihe interface (calling
conventions) by which an application program accesses operating system and other services. An
API is defined at source code level and provides a level of abstraction between the application
and the kernel (or other privileged utilities) to ensure the portability of the code." DataCore
Technology, Inc., Glossary of Terms, http://www.data-core.com/glossary-of-terms.htm (last
visited March 6, 2007).
16. Wikipedia, Web 2.0, http://en.wikipedia.org/wlki/Web_2.0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
A mashup is a web application that results when a web programmer combines two existing web
applications. Wikipedia, Mashup (web application hybrid), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Mashup_0%28web application-hybrid%29 (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
17. Andi Gutmnans, At the Whiteboard: What is Web 2.0?, http://news.zdnet.com
/html/z/wb/6103931.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0? Design
Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, O'REILLY, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html.
18. End-users are users who not only use web applications but also participate in Web 2.0
by "tagging content, contributing to the wiki, or doing podcasts or blogging." They contribute to
the social nature of Web 2.0 by being "an integral part of the data of the application, providing





22. Madden & Fox, supra note 5, at 2.
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population continues to discover Web 2.0, more and more people use its
activities and applications regularly. 3
C. Mixing and Mashing
The mashup is the most infamous Web 2.0 application.24 The name
mashup originated from music mashups, which produce "a new song by
mixing two or more existing pieces. '25  A web mashup is a "web
application hybrid"-a website or web application that uses content from
more than one source to create a completely new service. 26 Some people
predicted that in 2007, approximately 10 mashups were created daily,
evidencing that mashups are "the fastest growing ecosystem on the Web. 27
This is greatly due to the ease of creating a mashup.28
Programmers create mashups by combining two or more APIs, which
web companies license out. 29 Third parties, like Google or Flickr, typically
provide the content for a mashup by means of a public API,30 an application
programming interface. 31 APIs are "[t]he interface (calling conventions) by
which an application program accesses operating system and other
services. An API is defined at source code level and provides a level of
abstraction between the application and the kernel (or other privileged
utilities) to ensure the portability of the code. '32 ProgrammableWeb, a
website that lists many available APIs for mashup creation, defines an API
as "a set of functions that one computer program makes available to other
programs so they can talk to it directly. 33 APIs often come from unrelated
23. Id. For example, in 2005 34% of users (about 49 million American adults) had used
Internet services to display or print photos, whereas four years prior only 20% (roughly 23
million American adults) had done so. Id. at 2-3. This drastic difference exists largely in part
because of Web 2.0 services like Flickr and Photobucket, as opposed to the Web 1.0 photo
services like Kodakgallery. Id. at 3.
24. Gutmans, supra note 17.
25. Mashup, supra note 16.
26. Id.; see, e.g., HakuHaku, a mashup using AOL Video, Google Video and Flickr APIs.
Additional mashup examples are available at www.programmableweb.com.
27. Mashup, supra note 16.
28. Id.
29. Gutmans, supra note 17; see, e.g., eBay API License Agreement,
http://developer.ebay.com/join/licenses/individual (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
30. See Flickr Services - API Documentation, http://flickr.com/services/api/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2007); see also Google Code - Google APIs, http://code.google.com/apis/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2007).
31. Mashup, supra note 16; see also Wikipedia, Application Programming Interface (API),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
32. DataCore Technology, Inc., Glossary of Terms, supra note 15.
33. ProgrammableWeb, FAQ: What is an API?, http://www.programmableweb.com/ faq
(last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
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websites, and sometimes even from competing sites.3 4 Some companies
choose to protect their APIs and not make them available to the public.35
In contrast, other companies that foresee the future of Internet technologies
and the benefit of allowing any programmer to create new applications
using their APIs, make theirs available for licensing.36 APIs such as these
are called "open."
37
The advantage to offering an API as "open" is that such APIs then are
available to and accessed by numerous developers.38 This access in turn
fuels the creation of even more mashups.39  Specifically, website
companies can "tap the creativity and hard work of the masses, who do the
work and get out the word-and the software-through blogs and
websites.,, 40 The more that programmers use web companies' "open" APIs
in mashups, the more Internet users use and access those web companies'
applications and services.
While many Internet services provide their APIs to the public, the
website companies retain ultimate control of their programming code.4 '
For example, Google, which licenses out its Google Maps API, can
"withdraw this permission at any time and shut off the underlying service
facilitating the mash-ups. ' 42  So, when companies provide their APIs
openly, they do not necessarily permit any and all uses of those APIs.
API providers generally are unaware when a programmer creates a
mashup using their API.43 This is because the mashup programmer takes
two or more APIs and combines them to develop an entirely new web
service unbeknownst to the API providers. 4 Because programmers choose
which APIs to combine without notifying the API providers, and the
process returns the new service back to the programmer and not the API
34. Robert D. Hof, Mix, Match, And Mutate, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, July 25, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/@@aMrzTYQQQucvyQMA/magazine/content/05_30/b3944108-
mz063.htm.
35. API, supra note 31. Specifically, Sony only permits licensed PlayStation 2 developers
to use its PlayStation API because it wants to retain control of those who write games for its
gaming system.
36. Id. Unlike Sony, Microsoft freely licenses out its Microsoft Windows API so that
programmers in the everyday public can write new software for its Windows platform.
37. Id.
38. Gutmans, supra note 17.
39. Id.
40. Hof, supra note 34.
41. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2021 (2006).
42. See Google, Google Maps API Terms of Use, http://www.google.com/apis/
maps/terms.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007) (noting that Google may terminate Google Maps
whenever it wants to and for any reason).
43. Hof, supra note 34.
44. Mashup, supra note 16.
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providers,45 such providers are unaware which mashups or applications
programmers create from their APIs. Specifically, programmers create a
mashup when one API calls out to and accesses another API, combines the
data and services of both APIs, and then returns the new service back to the
creator.46 This results in an innovative website never before seen on the
web.47  For example, a programmer constructed the mashup
HousingMaps 48 from the Google Maps AP1
49 and from "screenscraping ' 50
craigslist.org's housing listings.5 1 This mashup allows Internet users to
search for available housing by viewing available housing listings and a
map of those listings' locations side-by-side. 2 Like HousingMaps, the
majority of existing mashups are simply "high-tech versions of Tinker
Toys . . . [b]ut from such whimsical experimentation the next tech
blockbuster often emerges.,
53
D. Where and How Liability May Arise
New issues of liability for copyright infringement have surfaced in the
Web 2.0 world because much of the content on websites is user-generated,
and new applications and websites are created unbeknownst to the API
owner. In particular, with the addition of the DMCA and its safe harbor
provisions for qualifying online service providers, other questions develop,
such as whether any infringement has taken place at all.
Possible copyright infringement actions that occur online include:
consumer uploading files; knowingly and unknowingly offering
copyrighted material for display by the way of web browsing; performing a
copyrighted work by way of streaming audio or video or downloading; and
sending email.54 While the individual who posts the infringing material is
45. Interview with AOL Programmer, AOL LLC, in Dulles, Va. (June 2006).
46. Id.; Mashup, supra note 16.
47. Id.
48. See HousingMaps, http://www.housingmaps.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
49. See Google Maps API, http://www.google.com/apis/maps/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
50. "Screen scraping is a technique in which a computer program extracts data from the
display output of another program.... The key element that distinguishes screen scraping from
regular parsing is that the output being scraped was intended for final display to a human user,
rather than as input to another program, and is therefore usually neither documented nor
structured for convenient parsing." Wikipedia, Screenscraping, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Screenscraping (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
51. Craigslist.org does not have its own API, so to create mashups utilizing craigslist's data,
creators "screenscrape." Programmable Web - Forum, Craigslist API, http://
www.programmableweb.com/forum/viewtopic.php?pid=479 (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
52. HousingMaps, supra note 48.
53. Hof, supra note 34.
54. BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUINARD, COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL AGE § 14:2.1
(2006).
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the obvious target for direct infringement, the website may also face
liability."
To avoid liability, a website operator seeking to place copyrighted
content from a third party on his or her website must obtain permission to
do so, usually by requesting a license to use the copyrighted material.5 6 On
Web 2.0 applications, however, users contribute the copyrighted content
onto websites, often without the copyright holder's permission and without
the website operator's knowledge. For example, on Flickr.com, users post
photos or images, some which may be copyrighted material.57 Thus,
Flickr's website operator does not create the initial reproduction of the
copyrighted work, the user does.58 When one or more websites with user-
created content are "mashed" together to form a new website, many new
questions arise regarding the potential liability for copyright infringement
that the newly created website, the mashup, may face.
III. Types of Copyright Liability
Copyright law recognizes different types of liability: (1) primary
liability for direct infringement, and (2) secondary liability for indirect
infringement. 9
A. Direct Infringement
A copyright owner holds the exclusive rights to reproduce his or her
work, create derivative works, distribute copies to the public, publicly
perform the work, and publicly display the work.60 A person who violates
any of these exclusive rights is a direct infringer and thus is subject to
primary liability for copyright infringement.6' People can be liable for
direct infringement regardless of whether they had an intent to infringe
another's copyright.62 To prove that a defendant directly infringed a
55. Id.
56. Id. § 14:2.3
57. See Welcome to Flickr - Photo Sharing, http://www.flickr.com/.
58. Copyright owners have the exclusive right to reproduction or duplication. 17 U.S.C. §
117(2000).
59. See, e.g., Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovision, 277 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the
unauthorized distribution of a "copyrighted work... is a direct infringement itself, not an act of
contributory or vicarious infringement.").
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
61. Id. § 501(a) (2000).
62. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Intent or
knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement.").
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copyright, the plaintiff only needs to show that it possesses a valid
copyright and that the defendant violated one of its exclusive rights.
63
B. Liability for the Infringing Acts of Others
The Copyright Act expressly provides for direct infringement liability
but fails to address whether a party is liable for "secondary
infringement"-the infringing acts of another party.64  Courts refuse,
however, to think that because Congress did not expressly provide liability
for such acts, copyright law does not impose secondary liability. Rather,
they developed judicial doctrines of vicarious, contributory, and, recently,
inducement liability, to do so. 6 5  Nonetheless, courts cannot find a
defendant secondarily liable for indirect copyright infringement absent an
instance of direct infringement.66
1. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability grew out of the tort agency principle of respondeat
superior.67  Specifically, it came from the "dance hall" cases, like
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,68 where courts
held the dance hall operators liable for infringing performances that took
place in their venue. 69 For a court to find vicarious liability the defendant
must possess the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, and
the defendant must have a direct financial interest in the infringing
activity.7° Courts may impose vicarious liability even when a defendant
lacks knowledge of the infringement.7'
Courts have taken several views regarding liability for vicarious
infringement. These stances depend on whether or not the defendant has
the right to supervise the infringing activity. While some cases hold that
63. 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01
(2006).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000).
65. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005)
(adopting patent law's inducement paradigm); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding a concert promoter liable even
though he did not perform the copyrighted work himself); and Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding dance hall operators liable for profiting
from infringing acts of hired performers).
66. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
67. Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996).
68. 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929).
69. Id. at 355.
70. 3-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.04[A][23(2006).
71. Id.
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landlords do not face liability for the infringing acts of their tenants
because they do not have the right to supervise their tenants' activities,72
other cases found premises operators liable for infringing activities and
performances by others.73 The Ninth Circuit extended the latter theory to
computer programs in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. ("Napster").
74
The Ninth Circuit held Napster liable for the infringing activities of its
users because it supervised them (by exercising discretion to terminate their
membership), and because it enabled its software to locate infringing
material on its system. 75  Regarding infringement on the Internet, some
courts also have noted that having the ability to delete infringing material
from a website after it was posted satisfies the supervision and control
element.76
A defendant's ability to supervise and control infringing activity alone
will not determine vicarious liability-the defendant must also obtain some
financial benefit from the infringing activity.77 Courts have concluded that
receiving a financial benefit can occur by collecting a percentage of
commission of sales from infringed works,78 creating a draw for
customers,79 using copyrighted content to attract customers, 8° or having a
future hope to monetize. 81 Thus, either a direct or indirect financial gain
suffices for vicarious liability.
2. Contributory Liability
Contributory liability is triggered when a person or entity: (1) engages
in personal conduct that encourages or facilitates the infringement,82 or (2)
72. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that "[s]omething
more than the mere relation of landlord and tenant must exist to give rise to a cause of action by
plaintiffs against... defendants for infringement of their copyright on the demised premises.").
73. Dreamland Ball Room, 36 F.2d at 355. See also Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 262-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding a flea market operator vicariously liable for the sale
of infringing works on its premises).
74. 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000).
75. Id.
76. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
77. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, at § 12.04[A][2].
78. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
79. Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1173 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
81. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
82. Matthew Bender & Co., v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
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provides the means to infringe by supplying the necessary machinery or
goods contributing to the infringement.
83
Under personal conduct contributory liability, "[o]ne who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." 84  Assisting or authorizing infringing activity
must directly relate to the direct infringer's infringing acts, and such
assistance or authorization must be done "in concert with the infringer."
85
Such liability occurs when one has knowledge that "the work in question
constitutes an infringement" and then "causes another to infringe." 86 A
potential contributory infringer must have actual knowledge or constructive
knowledge of a direct infringement to be liable.87 For example, in Napster,
Napster possessed both actual and constructive knowledge that its users
were engaging in direct infringement.88 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Napster had actual knowledge (1) based on an email from
its cofounder, noting that its users were "exchanging pirated music," and
(2) because the Recording Industry Association of America informed
Napster that several thousand MP3 files on its system were infringing.
89
The trial court found that Napster had constructive knowledge because its
executives were experienced in the recording industry, had knowledge of
enforcing intellectual property rights, had downloaded infringing songs
from Napster themselves, and had advertised Napster with Napster screen
images showing infringing MP3 music.
90
Aside from engaging in personal conduct that encourages
infringement, defendants can be liable for materially contributing to the
direct infringement-i.e., by "furnishing a copyrighted work to another,
who in turn wrongfully copies from such work."91 If, however, a defendant
provided the work to another and was unaware of the other's intent to
infringe, or if the provider required that the recipient obtain consent from
83. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][3]; see also Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971) ("One who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer.").
84. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162).
85. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][3][a].
86. Id.
87. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
88. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 1020 n.5 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918
(N.D. Cal. 2000)).
90. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
91. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][3][b]; see, e.g., Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at
919-20 (the district court found that Napster materially contributed to the infringement by
providing the site and facilities for the infringement).
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the copyright owner to use the work, no liability will attach.92 Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.93 is a key case dealing with liability for
material contributory infringement. In Sony, the Court addressed whether
Sony was a contributory infringer because its Betamax video tape recorders
allowed users to record Universal's television programs that were
broadcasted on public airwaves. 94 The Court found that because Sony's
Betamax recorders have "substantial non-infringing uses," selling them to
the public did not subject Sony to contributory infringement.95 Thus, Sony
presents a noteworthy standard on how persons or entities can avoid
liability for many potentially infringing products.
3. Inducement Liability - MGM v. Grokster
Although Sony provided a scapegoat from contributory liability for
those whose products also had significant non-infringing uses, the United
States Supreme Court created a new way to impose liability.96 In its 2005
opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
("Grokster"), the Court clarified the law regarding intent to induce
infringement. 97 The Court held that "where an article is 'good for nothing
else' but infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its
unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing
an intent to infringe." 98 The Sony rule, as Grokster clarified, protects
persons and entities from contributory infringement "based on presuming
or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or
distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement." 99 Importantly, Grokster
noted that such protection should not apply when one purposefully intends
to cause infringement independently from the "design and distribution of
the product."'00  Thus, Grokster set forth a new form of infringement,
intent to induce infringement. Inducement infringement provides that,
regardless of evidence of substantial lawful uses, "one who distributes a
92. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][3][b].
93. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
94. Id. at 419-20.
95. Id. at 455.
96. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 932.
99. Id. at 933.
100. Id. at 934.
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device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright ...is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."' '
C. Saved by the DMCA Safe Harbor
Because of the frustration between the online community and
copyright owners, Congress enacted the DMCA 10 2 as a compromise
between these competing forces. 10 3 Under section 512(c) of the Copyright
Act, OSPs 10 4 can avoid liability for infringing material residing on their
systems at the behest of users. 10 5 To qualify for protection under section
512(c), the OSP must meet several requirements: (1) the OSP cannot have
"actual knowledge" that the infringing material is on its system; 10 6 (2) the
OSP must be unaware "of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent;"' 0 7 (3) the OSP must promptly "remove, or disable
access to, the material" upon notification or obtaining knowledge of the
infringing activity;10 8 (4) the OSP must not receive any financial benefit
from the infringing activity if it controls such activity; 109 and (5) the OSP
must have designated an agent to receive notifications of copyright
infringement on its system.I1° Additionally, the OSP must accommodate
and avoid interference with "standard technical measures," which copyright
101. Id. at 936-37. The Court compared such reasoning with an exemption found in the
patent statutes, where those who distribute a staple article of commerce are not exempt from
liability if they induce patent infringement. Id. at 935 n.10; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000)
("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
102. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
103. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 54, § 14.1. The safe harbors encourage OSPs to work
with copyright holders by implementing notice and take-down provisions when the OSPs are
aware of copyright infringement on their systems or network and have the capabilities of stopping
it.
104. Under the DMCA, a service provider includes "a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(I)(B) (2000). Courts have
interpreted "service providers" broadly such that websites that permit users to post and access
information are covered. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701
(D. Md. 2001) (holding that a website that permits users to post and access commercial real estate
listings is a service provider); Hendnckson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (noting that there is "good reason to believe" that a site like eBay qualifies as a service
provider).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000). The DMCA codified RTC v. Netcom and allows copyright
holders to ask that an OSP remove access to copyright infringing material if the OSP provides
access to the copyrighted material.
106. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
107. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
108. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 512(c)(1)(C).
109. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
110. Id. § 512(c)(2).
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owners use to detect and guard against copyrighted infringement of their
works. 1
Adding section 512 to the Copyright Act did not "rewrite copyright
law for the online world."' 12 In other words, the DMCA did not alter any
preexisting copyright law. 1 3  Instead, the DMCA safe harbors exempt
OSPs, including ISPs1 14 and websites, from liability providing that they
implement "good citizenship" policies.1 15 Examples of such policies
include: (1) implementing notice and take-down procedures that allow
copyright owners to notify the website companies of infringing material
and that require the website companies to take down that material; and (2)
implementing a policy of terminating subscribers who continually
infringe.' 1 6 OSPs are not automatically subject to liability for infringement,
however, for merely failing to qualify for a DMCA safe harbor.' 17 For
example, a defendant may have other defenses against copyright
infringement available to it, and the plaintiff still bears the burden of
proving the elements of infringement. 
1 8
Section 512(c) plays an interesting role with respect to Web 2.0
mashups. Websites containing user-generated content used to make a
mashup can avoid liability under section 512(c), provided that they have
the required take-down procedures and policies for terminating recurring
infringing subscribers." 9 For example, a user could upload a movie clip
onto YouTube, 120 thereby infringing on the copyright owner's rights to
duplicate and publicly display its work. Under general copyright law,
YouTube could be held vicariously liable for receiving a financial benefit
and for having the ability to supervise the infringing activity.121 YouTube
could also be held contributorily liable for providing a space in which the
111. Id. § 512(i).
112. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ellison v.
Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
113. Yen, supra note 1, at 1834.
114. ISPs are businesses or organizations that provide connection to the Internet. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2000); Wikipedia, Internet Service Provider, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Intemetservice-provider (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
115. Id.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
117. 3-12B NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12B.06 (2006).
118. Id.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
120. "YouTube is a consumer media company for people to watch and share original videos
worldwide through a Web experience." YouTube Fact Sheet, Overview and Features,
http://www.youtube.com/t/fact-sheet (last visited March 6, 2007). Some common features allow
users to imbed YouTube videos onto other websites, publicly broadcast their own video clips, or
share video clips privately. Id.
121. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][2].
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infringement can occur. 122 But, if YouTube complies with section 512(c)
requirements, it escapes liability. When, however, the YouTube API is
mashed up with another website's API and the infringing movie clip on
YouTube is available in a new space, unexplored issues of potential
liability facing the mashup's creator or operator surface.
IV. Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups
With the advent of mashups-where the content from one website
may be combined with another to form a wholly new website displaying
infringing material to the public-new realms of liability arise with respect
to the mashup and its creator. The following sections explore whether a
newly created mashup website can "piggy back" on the initial websites'
protection from liability under the section 512(c) safe harbor, or whether
the mashup may be subject to primary liability.
A. Primary Liability - Direct Infringement
In Web 1.0, only website operators contributed content to websites.
123
Thus, in Web 1.0, website operators were direct infringers because they
were the only ones placing copyrighted material on websites. 124 On the
Web 2.0 Internet, however, website operators do not control or determine
the content that resides on their website because much of it is user
generated. 125 In this model, the users uploading copyrighted material onto
the Internet are the ones contributing the copyrighted work and are thus the
direct infringers. 126 By uploading a copyrighted picture, for example, a
user infringes the copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce, publicly
display, distribute, and adapt the work.127 By placing copyrighted material
on a webpage without a license, the website operator or user creates a
"computer-readable copy," which constitutes an unauthorized reproduction
of the original work, as well as publicly displays and distributes it. 128
Additionally, streaming audio and video may implicate the copyright
122. Id. §12.04[A][3]; see also Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) ("One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer.").
123. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 54, § 14:2.3[A].
124. Id. Web 1.0 website operators, however, would not be liable if they had a license from
the work's owner or other copyright defenses, such as fair use, applied.
125. Gutmans, supra note 17; O'Reilly, supra note 17.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000). Direct infringement occurs when an unauthorized individual
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owner's right to public performance and public display of his work. 29
Further, by placing the material on the Internet in an electronic version, the
user or website operator may create an adaptation of the original work.
130
Thus, a website operator or user may directly violate many of the exclusive
rights of a copyright owner.
Under the doctrine of direct infringement, regardless of any safe
harbors that may cover the underlying websites, a court could find that a
mashup website is itself a direct infringer publicly displaying, reproducing,
and distributing to the public the protected original work. Specifically, the
Copyright Act provides that one can infringe by "reproducing the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, 131 "display[ing] the
copyrighted work publicly,"'1 32  and/or "distribut[ing] copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public."' 33 Like the initial
user who places the infringing material on the website, a mashup also
creates another copy of a protected work on the mashup website, and
distributes the copy to the public and publicly displays the original work in
the new space on the mashup website. Following this reasoning, a court
could determine that the mashup creator is himself a direct infringer.
134
1. Mashup Creators Should Not Be Liable for Direct Infringement Because They
Lack Volition.
Although the statutory language would allow a court to find a mashup
creator primarily liable for direct infringement, mashup creators lack
volition, which is an important element of direct liability.135 Even though
the infringer need not know he is infringing or intend to infringe, the
Copyright Act requires meaningful conduct to infringe., 136 To be a direct
infringer, therefore, one's actions must be volitional. 137 Applied to
copyright infringement, "the act constituting infringement" must be






131. Id. § 106(1).
132. Id. § 106(5).
133. Id. § 106(3).
134. Cf Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion based on creating a public display was retracted from the opinion and thus
not binding).
135. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549-51 (4th Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 549.
137. Id. at 551. Volition is "[t]he ability to make a choice or determine something." Black's
Law Dictionary 1605 (8th Ed. 2004).
138. CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550-51.
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Mashup creators will generally lack this volitional element because
the creators generally intend to make an entirely new website or web
service, rather than intend to reproduce or make illegal copies of
copyrighted material. Unlike Web 1.0 OSPs, mashups do not themselves
do the copying because users create the copy when they initially upload the
copyrighted material. For example, in a mashup combining the Flickr
photo API and Google Earth API, which would show users' photos on a
virtual map in the actual places they were taken, the user creates an
infringing copy when it uploads a copyrighted photo to its Flickr account.
Such action is volitional because the user chooses to upload the
copyrighted image. When the mashup creator makes the mashup, however,
he does not choose to create an additional copy or even use infringing
material. Instead, he only determines which APIs to combine and chooses
what service or new website to create.
The court in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc. ("Netcom") recognized the volition
requirement's importance.1 39  The court noted that this additional
requirement is crucial in the cyberspace world because many different
parties are involved in the "establishment and maintenance of an Internet
facility.' 140 Because mashup creators' actions are not closely connected to
the actual illegal copying, they should not be liable as direct infringers,
even though the direct language of Copyright Act sections 106 and 501
would allow a court to conclude so.
2. Policy Reasons Disfavor Finding Mashups Directly Liable
From a policy perspective, Netcom noted that "it does not make sense
to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role
in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system
that is necessary to the function of the Internet."' 141 One could argue that
mashups and other Web 2.0 applications are not "necessary to the function
of the Internet," while online service providers and internet service
providers who provide the Internet services and connection to it are.
42
Mashups and Web 2.0 applications, however, are being freely welcomed by
the Internet and Web community at large. 43 Moreover, where they may
not be entirely necessary to the "function of the Internet," these
advancements evidence a new era in web technology that creates new
opportunities for all types of individuals and benefit society. Such
139. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1372.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(2000).
143. Hof, supra note 34.
opportunities range from adding ease to every day life by providing driving
directions and crime reports for certain locations to providing a new way
for consumers "to customize their web surfing experience and identity"
144
to allowing companies to create mashup software that helps them analyze
the competition. 145  Further, because programmers can create mashups
quickly and cheaply, mashups have even been helpful in aiding emergency
situations. 146 Therefore, because so many parties would be liable for a
meaningless role in the infringement, and mashups provide useful and
helpful services to several aspects of society, courts should not find
mashups liable for direct infringement.
3. A Court Should Not Hold Mashups Directly Liable Because the Mashup Only
Occupies a Passive Role to the Infringing Acts.
Aside for policy reasons supporting a finding against liability, courts
should also find against direct liability because the mashup programmer's
role in the infringement is merely passive. Particularly, the mashup
programmer's role does not extend beyond combining two existing APIs.
Although the creator actively chooses which two APIs to combine to make
the new application, he is a passive bystander to the infringement. Mashup
programmers are passive because the infringement occurred prior to the
mashup's creation and did not occur on the mashed up websites. Like non-
mashup websites that contain infringing material on their systems at the
behest of users, the same scenario arises on mashups-infringing
information stored on a mashup website originates also from the user who
uploaded copyrighted material to the website used to create the mashup. A
court, therefore, could interpret that mashups resemble the initial websites,
which can invoke the 512(c) protections for storing infringing material at
the direction of their users. Courts, therefore, should extend section 512(c)
safe harbor provisions to mashups because, like the initial websites'
operators, mashup programmers merely play a passive role regarding
infringement.
The mashup creator also holds a passive role because unlike the initial
infringing user, the mashup creator most likely lacks actual knowledge that
the mashup he creates may make protected works available to the public.
Although this is a significant fact to determining liability of a mashup,
144. Vance McCarthy, StrikeIron: Telephone Mashups Meet Web 2.0, Integration Developers
News, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.idevnews.com/IntegrationNews.asp?ID=272.
145. Ben Worthen, 'Mashups' Sew Data Together, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 31,
2007.
146. Within a month after Hurricane Katrina hit, software programmers created a mashup
that allowed storm trackers to see the weather conditions and information of emergency service
providers all on one map. Id.
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intent to infringe is not a requirement of direct infringement. 147  Thus,
whereas a mashup may not intend for infringing material to be part of its
content, a lack of intent alone will not prevent it from being a direct
infringer. However, while intent to infringe is not required for direct
liability, volition is. So, even though it may not matter that the mashup
programmer did not intend to display copyrighted material to the public,
the fact that he did not actively choose what specific material to display on
his website, but rather only chose what service or application to create,
further supports a finding that mashups are not directly liable for displaying
infringing material.
Because of their passive role, mashup programmers resemble the
initial websites more than a user posting infringing material, and courts
should not hold them liable for the infringing acts of others by extending
the DMCA's safe harbors to mashup websites.
B. Secondary Liability - Indirect Infringement
Although users are truly direct infringers and the easiest to locate and
establish liability against, they are often judgment proof.148  Thus,
copyright owners seek damages against service providers, software
creators, or website operators with deep pockets via secondary liability.
149
Additionally, as new web technologies increase the occurrences of direct
infringement, seeking relief from those who make the direct infringement
possible is a more efficient way to "tame the wild frontiers of the
Internet."'150 Importantly, although such technological innovations increase
the likelihood "that copyright infringement will occur.., the provision of
these services alone does not result in copyright infringement because no
infringement occurs until a subscriber misuses the Internet service."' 5'1 The
aforementioned rule that there is no secondary liability without primary
liability 152 is crucial to an analysis of potential secondary liability for
mashups and other Web 2.0 applications. In other words, for contributory
or vicarious liability for copyright infringement to exist, there must first be
147. See Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Intent or
knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement.").
148. Assaf Hamdani, Who Is Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 910-11
(2002) ("Even when the identity of infringers is uncovered, they often turn out to be judgment-
proof teenagers or college students, who lack the means to pay damages.").
149. Id.
150. Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of
Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Infringement to Resolve the War Between Content and
Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 170 (2005).
151. Yen, supra note 1, at 1857-58.
152. See supra Part Ill(A).
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an instance of direct infringement. 5 3 One must keep this in mind while
undergoing an infringement analysis of mashups, for the direct infringer,
the user, is one step further removed from the mashup.
1. Vicarious Infringement
As mentioned in Part III(B)(i), for an entity to be vicariously liable for
copyright infringement it must (1) have the ability to control or supervise
the infringing activity, and (2) have a direct financial interest in the
infringement. 154 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found Napster vicariously
liable because its software allowed users to copy, download, upload, and
distribute A&M Records' copyrighted music. 155 Particularly, Napster had
the ability to supervise its users because it could block users about whom
copyright owners complained.156 The Napster court found that Napster had
a financial interest in the infringing activity, for "future revenue is directly
dependent upon 'increase in user-base.' More users register with the
Napster system as the 'quality and quantity of available music
increases.",,157 Napster's future hope to monetize satisfied this element
because it showed it had a financial interest even though there might not be
any initial receipt of funds.' 58
Unlike the Napster software or websites like Flickr or YouTube, a
mashup that a programmer creates from such websites' APIs does not meet
the elements of vicariously liability. First, the mashup creator or operator
lacks the ability to control the content residing on the underlying webpages
it combines to form the mashup. Users initially access the mashed
websites, not the mashup. Thus, the creator cannot exercise control over or
block users' access to its system, as could Napster, because the APIs
supply the content. Nor can it control or supervise the activities of users on
the initial websites. Thus, the mashup operator cannot police its service
because the website licensing the API has more control to take down any
infringing material that appears on its site at the behest of users. Likewise,
as mentioned in Part II(B), the website companies retain ultimate control of
their APIs, again evidencing that the website companies, and not the
mashups, are in the better position to supervise and control infringing
activities.
153. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
154. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][2].
155. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
156. Id. at 1023-24.
157. Id. at 1023.
158. Id.
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Second, to date, most mashups do not generate any money, so
mashups do not have a direct financial interest in the infringing activity:
So far, mashup business models don't extend beyond running a few
Google ads and collecting fees for sending buyers to e-commerce sites.
One reason is that most Web sites don't allow for profit use of their data
by outsiders. But as traffic to mashups grows, companies may cut deals -
especially if mashup sites spur new markets. Map-based mashups, for
instance, might finally attract ultra-local business to advertise on the
Web.
59
Infringing material on a mashup does not "draw" customers to the
mashup.160  Instead, if the infringing material has any "draw" at all, it
draws customers and users to the API providing website, thereby
constituting a financial benefit for the original website. Any financial
interest a mashup may possess would be related to the functions it provides,
rather than stemming from the infringing activity. Moreover, if the
infringing activity is what builds a user-base, it would benefit the initial
website and not the mashup, for the infringing material really resides on the
initial website's system. In particular, without infringing material first
residing on one of the initial websites, no infringing material could ever
appear on a mashup.161 Because mashups cannot supervise users placing
content on the initial websites and have no direct financial interest in the
infringing activity, courts likely will not hold mashups liable for vicarious
copyright infringement.
Lastly, because the API providing companies will claim safe harbor,
the chain of infringement breaks, destroying any link to an instance of
direct infringement. As previously mentioned, if there is no primary
liability, there cannot be secondary liability.162 Regarding mashups, if the
link to the direct infringement by the user is destroyed when the initial
website claims safe harbor, there may be no way to hold the mashup liable
for secondary, vicarious liability.'
63
2. Contributory Infringement
As stated in Part III(B)(ii), a person or entity can be found
contributorily liable for encouraging or facilitating the infringement or by
supplying the means to infringe. 164  A copyright owner would have
159. Hof, supra note 34.
160. See Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
161. For example, using the Flickr and Google Earth mashup example in Part IV.B, if no user
had uploaded infringing material onto Flickr, no infringing material would end up on the mashup.
162. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
163. Id.
164. 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 63, § 12.04[A][3].
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difficulty trying to establish liability against mashups under this doctrine
because the infringing activity does not take place on the mashup website,
but rather, on the websites used to make the mashup. Thus, a mashup itself
is not inducing, contributing to, or encouraging infringement. Usually, its
operations do not allow users to post infringing material directly to its site.
Instead, the infringement occurs on the initial site. Although mashups may
not encourage infringement, mashup creators may possess knowledge of
the infringing activity occurring on the API providing sites. 165 Like the
API providing websites who may have constructive knowledge that
infringing activity is taking place on their systems, the mashup also will
likely have actual or constructive knowledge that the websites used to
create the mashup probably contain infringing material. This knowledge
alone, however, is insufficient 166 to hold a mashup contributorily liable
because it does not contribute to, directly relate to, assist, or authorize any
of the infringing activity. 
167
Because mashups are a combination of two existing applications, and
generally do not provide users with a new space in which to upload
infringing material, they do not provide the means by which a user may
infringe. Whereas Napster provided a place and the facilities for its users
to engage in infringing activity, 168 mashups and other Web 2.0 applications
do not provide a new space for the infringement to occur. With mashups,
the infringement occurs on the initial websites, so it is the initial websites
that could face contributory liability for providing the means to infringe,
and not the mashup.
3. Inducement Infringement
Grokster laid out the new theory of secondary liability for creating
software that induces users to infringe, regardless of the availability of non-
infringing uses. 169  Finding mashup operators or creators liable for
inducement infringement seems very unlikely, because the mashup itself
has no inducing qualities. Specifically, a mashup is a combination of
already existing web services, and therefore, is not purporting to provide a
new service that would induce users to infringe on its site. For example,
HousingMaps, referenced in Part II(B), which combines Craigslist's
service and Google Maps' service, does not induce users to infringe on its
165. Id. § 12.04[A][3][a].
166. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
167. See 3-12 NIMMER, supra note 70, § 12.04[A][3][a]. The authorization or assistance,
however, must directly relate to the infringing acts of the direct infringer.
168. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919-20 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
169. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005); see
also Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
[30:311
"PIGGY BACKING" ON THE WEB 2.0 INTERNET
site. Users visit HousingMaps to utilize its new service, viewing housing
listings and their respective locations side-by-side. Similarly, based on the
Google Earth and Flickr mashup explained above in Part IV(A)(i), the
mashup would encourage Internet users to visit its site to view pictures of
various locations throughout the world. This mashup would not induce its
visitors to upload infringing material, because the actual site that allows
users to upload images is Flickr, not the mashup. Because the initial
websites provide facilities and tools for users to infringe copyrighted
works, a court is more likely to find those websites liable for inducement
infringement, rather than the mashup site.170
V. Escaping Liability
A. Battling Forces
Two battling forces exist within the copyright law arena: the copyright
owners and those who create new online technologies. Copyright
protection encourages those desiring to undergo creative pursuits to do so
because copyright protection "promote[s] the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts."'17 ' While copyright owners invoke the protections of
copyright law to enforce their rights and to encourage others to create new
works, inventors of new technologies prefer limiting liability for copyright
infringement. 172 The Grokster Court explained these competing values as
follows: "[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more technological
innovation may be discouraged." 173  Specifically, "[i]mposing liability
could ... limit further development of beneficial technologies."'174  As
more courts are willing to impose indirect liability to enforce copyright
protections, many programmers and software developers will lose any
incentive to create new methods of technological communication. But, if
the law promotes creating new technologies, "Progress" may be thwarted
as new technology platforms increase user infringement, thus discouraging
creative, artistic endeavors.
Courts and Congress have dealt with this battle for some time.
175
Congress intended the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to provide a
170. Although the mashed up websites are the best candidates for liability for inducement
infringement liability, they can avoid such liability under the DMCA's safe harbors. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
172. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929.
173. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929.
174. Id.
175. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1631-32 (2001).
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compromise between these competing forces. The DMCA balances these
different interests by (1) providing a framework by which the copyright
owners can attack instances of infringement and request their removal,
while (2) allowing the Internet technology inventors and operators to
continue to create new services to benefit society without the fear of facing
liability for the infringing actions of others. 176 Thus, because the DMCA
tried to resolve this issue, the law already appears to address the concern of
copyright owners, so liability should not extend to new Web 2.0
applications, like mashups, that do not exercise any control over its users,
provide an additional space for the infringement to occur by users, nor
receive or have any financial interest directly in assisting or authorizing
such infringing activities.
B. Lack of a Connection Between the Internet and the Underlying Policies
for Indirect Liability
"The tests for vicarious liability and contributory infringement ...
were crafted for a context far removed from global computer networks,
leaving us with rules that fail to serve the major policies that justify the
imposition of liability on someone who does not actually infringe anyone's
copyright."'
177
The underlying purpose of attaching liability for contributory
infringement is fairness. In imposing liability on those who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, assist infringement or have the ability
to prevent infringement and fail to do so, contributory liability promotes
fairness. 178 Furthermore, the rules of liability for contributory infringement
encourage online technologies to police their systems for incidents of
infringement.179 Encouraging policing, however, may not always promote
fairness. The fact that new technologies enable operators to know what
exactly occurs on their systems does not dictate the conclusion that holding
the online services liable for all infringing activity on their systems will
serve fairness.180 Placing such burdens on channels of communication may
inflict additional costs to society as whole, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of promoting fairness by imposing contributory liability.
Additionally, the principle of promoting fairness is closely connected to the
element of knowledge and contributory liability.' 18  Because the only
element of contributory liability that may apply to mashups is
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
177. Grossman, supra note 150, at 236.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id. at 161.
181. Id.
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knowledge,' 82 and knowledge alone is insufficient to impose indirect
liability, 83 contributory liability does not promote fairness in the world of
Web 2.0.
The doctrine of vicarious liability developed from the principle of cost
sharing. 84 "[B]y holding those who benefit from infringement liable, the
rules for secondary liability serve as a loss spreading function as well,
requiring businesses who benefit from the copyright infringement to
internalize those costs.'' 85 Cost sharing is irrelevant to Web 2.0 mashups
because the generative Internet is far different from the early dance hall
cases from which the doctrine of vicarious liability arose. Where the dance
hall operator profited from the infringing performances of hired
performers, 186 as discussed in Part III(C)(i), mashups do not even possess a
profiting business model. 187 Therefore, holding mashups vicariously liable
does not further the incentive to spread the loss among all potential
infringers because mashups have no financial interest in the infringing acts
of previous users. This is so mainly because the infringement occurs prior
to the mashup's creation.
Because the underlying purposes of promoting fairness and spreading
the loss are inapplicable in the Web 2.0 world, courts should not impose
indirect liability on mashups.
C. Possible Solutions
1. "Piggy Backing" and Claiming Safe Harbor
Mashups should be able to piggy back on the initial websites' safe
harbor protection. If a DMCA safe harbor protects the initial websites used
to create a mashup, then it should also protect the mashup because a
programmer makes the mashup with the protected websites. Specifically, if
a court cannot find secondary liability without first having primary
liability'-and the websites licensing out the APIs are claiming safe
harbor-the chain of infringement is broken. If the initial websites are able
to escape indirect liability via the safe harbor, the mashup should as well,
for mashups are less culpable than those initial sites.
182. See supra Part IV(B)(2).
183. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
184. Grossman, supra note 150, at 149.
185. Id.
186. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstien, & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir.
1929).
187. Hof, supra note 34.
188. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
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But, a mashup may not be able to qualify for its own safe harbor
because the users do not directly upload the infringing material onto the
mashup. Thus, a court may no longer consider the material user submitted.
The express language of section 512(c), however, provides a protection
from indirect liability for websites that have infringing information residing
on their systems because users have uploaded it. 189 Applying this direct
language would make a Web 2.0 mashup with user-generated content on its
system capable of protection under section 512(c). Although the user does
not directly upload the infringing material on the mashup, the mashup still
displays content originally uploaded by a user.
Thus, while protecting copyrighted works retains importance to
promote technological innovation, mashups, like other online service
providers and websites, should escape liability for the infringing actions of
others in which they play no role. Mashups can avoid liability by "piggy
backing" on the DMCA safe harbors that protect the underlying websites.
2. A Narrow Application of Existing Law Is More Appropriate than Overbreadth
Courts apply the existing law of indirect infringement too broadly.190
When courts apply the doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability
broadly they leave innovators and practitioners without the ability to
predict when new technologies will infringe copyright law. 91 If courts
apply existing law to new Internet technologies, they should do so
narrowly.1 92 Broad application of secondary copyright liability standards
could lead to "unlimited liability" for the creators of new technologies.
193
Courts should endorse only a narrow application of current copyright law
because existing precedent lacks any correlation with the digital age and
merely presents "thin analogies" to the problems Web 2.0 creates. 
194
VI. Conclusion
The DMCA's safe harbor provisions spawned from the Court's
holding in Netcom. 195  In finding that Netcom was not liable for the
infringing acts of its user, the Court focused on the policy consideration
that new technologies should be allowed to flourish. 196 The same policy
189. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
190. Grossman, supra note 150, at 223.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 159.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 222.
195. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
196. Id.
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judgments are present today with respect to new Web 2.0 technologies, and
thus, the same outcome should apply to regarding mashups.
"From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response
to significant changes in technology."' 197 With the evolution of the Web to
Web 2.0, copyright law should again make new developments with respect
to these user-oriented applications. Congress, as opposed to the courts, is
the most appropriate body to balance the competing interests of copyright
holders and Internet developers. 198 It did so with the addition of the
DMCA in 1998, and can do so again in this Web 2.0 world.
197. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
198. See id. at 456 ("It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new
technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to
apply laws that have note yet been written.").
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